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PROFESSOR SHANKER 
Wilbur C. Leatherberry† 
When I joined the faculty in 1973, all my colleagues called 
Professor Shanker ―Morry.‖ It took a while for me to get used to 
doing that because I was his student in four commercial law classes. 
He remained Professor Shanker—the one who talked about ―the 
majority view, the minority view, and the Shanker view.‖ As 
students, we knew that the Shanker view would be important on the 
exam. We also came to see that the Shanker view was always well-
supported and very often should have been the dominant view with 
respect to commercial law issues. 
Morry began teaching in 1961 as the Uniform Commercial Code 
(―UCC‖ or the ―Code‖) was sweeping the country. It was enacted in 
Ohio in 1962. Morry had several years of commercial law practice 
experience dealing with the jumble of statutes and case law that the 
UCC was designed to supplant. In my commercial law classes in 
1966–68, we read cases decided under the old law (since there were 
so few UCC decisions that entered the casebooks in those years) and 
attempted to apply the new code to those fact patterns. Morry was an 
enthusiastic and energetic advocate of the change wrought by the 
UCC. He spoke with admiration about the drafters, especially Karl 
Llewelyn and Grant Gilmore and gave us an appreciation of what a 
great achievement the Code was. He also pointed out the many 
drafting problems and made us think carefully about how courts 
should construe the ambiguities and fill the gaps in the text. 
As one who saw the benefits of the change wrought by Article 2, 
Morry wrote an article about the parallel development of strict tort 
products liability.
1
 He argued that individuals could be compensated 
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appropriately within the parameters of Article 2 for personal injuries 
caused by defective products. What the strict tort proponents saw as 
barriers to effective compensation could have been dealt with by 
courts applying Article 2 and by a few sensible amendments. What he 
considered unintended consequences of strict tort—elimination of any 
possibility of reducing the price of goods in exchange for a limitation 
of liability, for example—would have been avoided if Article 2 had 
been permitted to control the product liability field instead of strict 
tort.
2
 He may well have been right, but the dominant wave was led by 
Prosser, Traynor, and Wade and strict tort captured the field. 
Although strict tort did not completely eclipse the field, as Morry had 
first feared, it created some confusion for practicing lawyers and 
fodder for academics. In Morry’s words from an article he published 
in 1979: 
Strict tort has brought about substantively little, if anything, 
which was not available under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. It has given legal scholars the opportunity to discuss 
the interrelationship between the Commercial Code and strict 
tort ―with all the zeal, fury, and abstruseness of medieval 
theologians . . . .‖ But, for those who must live with these 
competing products liability systems and their different 
labels, it seems only to have brought about an enervating, 
costly, and confusing word game which hardly was worth the 
effort.
3
 
Morry was not a conservative generally opposed to change—he 
eagerly embraced the major reform the Code imposed on the 
commercial law field. He did oppose change for the sake of change, 
however. For example, he saw no reason for adoption of the major 
revision in Article 2 that was drafted by Professor Richard Speidel but 
never promulgated by the Commissioners because of vigorous 
opposition by both business and consumer interests. That draft 
changed virtually every section, inserted additional sections, and 
renumbered the sections. Many of the changes (like eliminating 
masculine pronouns) were matters of form rather than substance. Any 
change in statutory text risks creating ambiguity where none existed 
or inadvertently changing substance and producing unintended 
consequences. Fortunately, that draft died and a later, much less 
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ambitious revision appears to have died as well. The drafters created a 
flexible statute that was intended to be adapted and augmented by 
judicial decision and Morry firmly believed in that. 
Morry was sometimes frustrated to see that judges—and 
lawyers—did not always understand legal rules or the underlying 
policies and purposes. For example, he wrote an article about an Ohio 
case in which the Supreme Court confused the Statute of Frauds and 
the parol evidence rule.
4
 In the article he was very critical of the 
court’s opinion but he expressed some regret that he was so hard on 
the judges when it was likely that the lawyers had done a poor job of 
presenting and explaining the issues. 
Morry contributed an article to our law review providing a 
thorough Shanker-view analysis of the application of UCC 2-708(2).
5
 
He argued for strict interpretation of the statutory language that other 
commentators were ignoring in order to justify awarding damages to 
the lost-volume seller. He argued that, in the real world, few if any 
sellers were likely to suffer losses relating to a reduction in the 
number of units sold when a buyer breaches. In the event of a breach 
by the buyer, the seller who could resell the goods would lose nothing 
more than the difference between the contract price and the resale 
price, plus incidental expenses relating to the resale. In his view, that 
remedy was the only one the Code provided—and wisely so. Other 
commentators and courts believed that, at least in some cases, the 
seller lost volume, meaning that he sold one less unit than he 
otherwise would have sold. They construed UCC 2-708(2) to allow 
that seller to recover his profit plus the overhead applicable to that 
lost sale.  
The same issue of the law review included an excellent student 
note providing an economic analysis of the lost-volume argument.
6
 
That piece was early in the wave of economic analyses of legal issues. 
It applied microeconomic theory and concluded that Morry was right 
to be skeptical about the likelihood that a seller would actually lose 
volume in the event of a buyer’s breach. The piece also demonstrated 
that calculation of the appropriate damage award was considerably 
more complex and difficult than it appeared to be. The two pieces 
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were often cited together in discussions about the lost-volume-seller 
problem.
7
 
Morry must be our longest-serving faculty member. It is hard to 
imagine his 49 years of service being exceeded by anyone. He 
strongly influenced the thinking and the approach to legal issues of a 
huge number of students. In class, he was demanding but never 
unkind. He insisted on class preparation and called on students who 
returned to class after unexcused absences. He did not just accept a 
student’s statement that he was unprepared. Instead, he sometimes 
used an unprepared student as a blank slate with respect to issues 
treated by the Code section being considered. I recall being a truly 
blank slate on at least one occasion. He gave me credit for stating 
principles that would be right under the common law while pointing 
out that, had I read the Code section, I would have known that the 
Code rule was different. 
When I began teaching Contracts and, later, Sales, Morry was 
generous about discussing issues, but not overbearing or controlling 
about how I chose to handle the courses. He always provided me a 
copy of his teaching materials and clearly hoped I would use them, 
but I never did. I knew from his classes that I could not teach the 
courses his way. I lacked his practice experience and his depth of 
understanding of the history that underlays the Code, especially 
Articles 2 and 9.  
He taught Article 9 in a course called ―Property Security,‖ which 
included materials on real estate mortgages. He was convinced that 
familiarity with real estate mortgage law would help students 
understand personal property security issues in Article 9. When he 
gave up teaching that course after the major revision of Article 9 
(including addition of a number of sections and major reorganization, 
including renumbering), he urged me to teach an Article 9 course. He 
accepted the fact that I was not prepared to teach material about real 
estate mortgages, but assumed that, because I had been well taught 
with respect to the Code, I could do the job on Article 9. 
Morry was a very supportive faculty colleague, but was not 
reluctant to argue against what he regarded as proliferation of courses 
that distracted students from the core courses—like commercial law 
courses. He remained steadfast in his conviction that our principal 
obligation is to prepare lawyers for the real world of law practice. 
Morry was a teacher and a scholar. His one foray into 
administration was a semester spent as acting dean after Lou Toepfer 
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left the deanship to become president of the university. Morry did not 
enjoy that role and quickly returned to his faculty position. He was 
never fond of meetings and was quick to supply a motion to adjourn 
as faculty meetings came to a close. Others will now make that 
motion, but Morry set a standard of excellence and dedication for this 
school and for legal education that will rarely, if ever, be exceeded. 
 
